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Abstract. The paper documents three pieces of empirical evidence on fiscal policy in Africa. 
First, a bigger government increases the volatility of output growth. Second, fiscal policy has 
substantially Keynesian effects. Third, fiscal policy instruments in Africa behave either pro-
cyclically or a-cyclically, but practically never counter-cyclically. Taken together, these three 
findings imply that fiscal policy does not contribute to output stabilization. Quite the contrary, 
in several African countries fiscal policy is a source of volatility. Given the large development 
costs of volatility, ways to encourage the adoption of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance 
are then discussed. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study whether or not fiscal policy has contributed to the 
stabilization of output growth volatility in African countries. The analysis is articulated in two 
steps. The first step is the analysis of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy to understand 
whether or not they are of a Keynesian nature. The second step is the characterization of the 
cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy in terms of the correlation between policy instruments and 
output fluctuations. This two-step approach builds on a simple theoretical view: if fiscal 
policy has Keynesian effects, then it must be run counter-cyclically to stabilise output growth. 
On the contrary, were the effects of fiscal policy of a non-Keynesian nature, then output 
growth stabilization would be better pursued through a pro-cyclical stance. The bulk of the 
evidence provided in the paper indicates that: (i) in Africa, fiscal policy has prevalently 
Keynesian effects at both normal and non-normal fiscal times, but (ii) countries tend to adopt 
a pro-cyclical or an a-cyclical fiscal policy stance; thus implying that fiscal policy is not 
stabilizing. 
 
  Developing countries are generally characterised by a relatively large volatility of 
output growth in comparison to industrial economies. Table 1 documents this simple stylised 
fact. The table reports the standard deviation of per-capita GDP growth and per-capita private 
consumption growth in a number of country groups over two consecutive periods of time. On 
average, in low and middle income countries output growth volatility is 50% higher than in 
high income countries. Moreover, low and middle income countries do not seem to have 
experienced the same sharp decrease in volatility that instead has taken place in high income 
economies over time. The difference between the two groups is even more striking when   2
looking at private consumption growth volatility: the standard deviation in low and middle 
income countries together is on average twice as much as the standard deviation in high 
income countries. With respect to specific geographical groups, it appears that Africa is the 
region with the highest average volatility of both per-capita income growth and private 
consumption growth. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
  There is now a growing consensus that volatility has undesirable development effects. 
A number of papers estimate large welfare costs of output volatility (see, for instance, Van 
Wincoop, 1994, Campbell, 1998, Campbell and Cochrane, 2000, Loayza et al. 2007). While 
this result is not always consensual
1, a rather voluminous body of empirical evidence points to 
a growth-reducing effect of volatility (see Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Martin and Rogers, 2000; 
Fatas, 2002; Hnatvoska and Loyaza, 2005). Kose et al. (2005) suggest that the relationship 
between volatility and long-term growth remains negative, albeit less strong, even in the 
globalization era. In a similar vein, Aghion et al. (2005) develop a theoretical model to show 
that under conditions of financial underdevelopment (where firms are subject to tight 
borrowing constraints in recessions), macroeconomic volatility reduces productivity growth 
by preventing firms from investing in technology and innovation in the face of idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks. In a developmental perspective, volatility can be particularly bad for poverty 
reduction. Its effects are in fact likely to be asymmetric between the poor and the rich as the 
former have less means to smooth consumption and stabilize living standards across cyclical 
phases.  
 
                                                 
1 See for instance Lucas (1987) and Otrok (2001). Pallage and Robe (2003) however stress that even though 
under specific model assumptions the welfare costs of output fluctuations might be of a second-order in 
industrial economies, they are significantly higher in developing countries.    3
  Stabilisation must therefore come as a policy priority in developing countries, even 
more so in Africa where volatility is on average higher, growth more fragile, and poverty 
deeper than elsewhere. Stabilisation in turn requires two complementary courses of actions. 
One involves the design of structural reforms to address the root causes of volatility. In the 
case of Africa, this would mean reducing the dependence on primary commodity exports (in 
order to reduce country’s vulnerability to international price shocks) and promoting more 
stable socio-political conditions. The other course of actions concerns the setting of 
macroeconomic policy in response to cyclical fluctuations; that is, how macroeconomic 
instruments are used to absorb volatility. This paper looks at this second aspect. Its specific 
focus on the fiscal dimension of macroeconomic policy has a twofold motivation. First, 
several African countries have adopted fixed exchange rate regimes, thus somewhat loosing 
control over monetary policy for domestic stabilisation purposes. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, fiscal policy is a key policy tool that governments can use to mobilize domestic 
resources and allocate them to the pursuit of socio-economic development objectives.  
 
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly sets the paper in the 
context of the existing literature and outlines the empirical approach. Section 3 estimates the 
marginal effect of fiscal policy variables on per-capita private consumption growth as a means 
to determine the nature (Keynesian vs. non-Keynesian) of fiscal policy effects. Section 4 
looks at the cycles of output and their correlation with fiscal policy instruments to determine 
whether fiscal policy is conducted pro-cyclically or counter-cyclically. Section 5 takes stock 
of the results of the previous two sections to discuss policy design in Africa. Section 6 
concludes and sets the lines of future research. The Appendix provides a description of the 
variables used in the empirical analysis, a list of countries in the sample, and some additional 
econometric results not reported in the main text.   4
 
2.  Overview of the issue 
 
2.1   A bird-eye view of some relevant literature 
 
In the textbook Keynesian view, a fiscal stimulus (i.e. an increase in expenditure 
and/or a decrease in taxation leading to a deterioration of the overall budget balance) 
increases private consumption and output. As a consequence, fiscal policy should be run 
counter-cyclically to reduce output volatility. Support for this view comes from the findings 
of Gali (1994) and Fatas and Mihov (2001) who document empirically a robust negative 
correlation between government size and output volatility in OECD economies. Andres et al. 
(2008) rationalize this negative correlation in a model with nominal rigidities and rule-of-
thumb consumers.  
 
The Keynesian view however does not go unchallenged. Prompted by the findings of 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990 and 1996), some papers have formalized the possibility that fiscal 
policy has non-Keynesian effects (see for instance Blanchard, 1990; Sutherland 1997; and 
Giavazzi et al. 2000). In this type of models, a fiscal expansion is contractionary because it 
reduces household’s private consumption. The transmission mechanism may work through 
the expectation that taxes will increase in the future and/or via the wealth effect associated 
with the upward adjustment of interest rates. In both cases, the likelihood that fiscal policy 
has non-Keynesian effects increases at non-normal fiscal times; that is, at times when the 
change in the overall budget balance is significantly larger than average. 
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Of course, if fiscal policy had non-Keynesian effects, then it should be run pro-
cyclically (and not counter-cyclically) to stabilize output fluctuations. In fact, some recent 
empirical evidence on both industrial and developing economies suggests that non-Keynesian 
effects tend to be the exception rather than the rule and that in general private consumption 
positively responds to an increase in government expenditure (see for instance, Van Aerle and 
Garretsen, 2003; Schlarek, 2007, and Carmignani, 2008). Gali et al. (2007) account for this 
evidence in a dynamic optimizing sticky price models with rule-of-thumb consumers.  
  
In spite of the fact that fiscal policy seems to have predominantly Keynesian effects, 
the available evidence suggests that in practice countries quite often take a pro-cyclical stance. 
This seems to be particularly the case in developing economies (see Kamisky et al. 2004 and 
Iltzezki and Vegh, 2008). Two main explanations have been put forward for this sub-optimal 
cyclical pattern of fiscal policy. One has to do with the supply of credit (see again Kamisky et 
al. 2004). When going through a recession, countries’ access to credit is severely restricted, so 
that they cannot run deficits and have to cut on expenditures. On the contrary, when economic 
conditions improve, easily available credit is used to finance larger expenditures. The other 
explanation emphasizes political-economy channels. In this respect, Alesina et al. (2008) 
argue that voters demand higher spending at times of economic boom in order to starve a 
Leviathan government. The resulting equilibrium yields a pro-cyclical pattern of fiscal policy 
instruments.    
 
In spite of the relevance of these issues for policymakers, there is little research that 
systematically focuses on the case of African countries. The empirical results obtained from 
large samples of developing countries may not necessarily apply to Africa for two reasons. 
One is that those samples of developing countries typically include very few African   6
economies (and usually, they include only the most advanced of African economies, hence 
neglecting the many least developed countries in the region). The other reason is that in 
general structural economic relationships in African countries tend to be different from those 
that characterize the rest of the developing world. This is very evident, for instance, from the 
literature on the empirics of growth: even after controlling for a myriad of structural factors, 
the dummy variable for Africa tends to remain negative and statistically highly significant. 
From a policymaking perspective, it is therefore important to provide evidence that is region-
specific, if not country specific. Diallo (2008) makes an important step in this direction, 
showing that democracy is conducive to a counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance in Africa.  
 
Against this background, the paper looks at cyclical fiscal policy in an African 
perspective. Its value added relative to the existing literature is as follows. First, in assessing 
whether fiscal policy has Keynesian or non-Keynesian effects, the paper provides a 
systematic structural comparison of African vis-à-vis other developing countries. The paper 
therefore addresses the issue of whether or not there is a systematic structurally different 
behaviour between African and the other developing countries. Second, in studying the 
cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy, the paper provides both continental-wide empirical 
evidence and country-specific evidence. In this way, it avoids inappropriate generalizations 
across heterogeneous countries. Third, the paper makes use of a composite methodological 
approach, including output volatility regressions, private consumption regressions, and 
business cycle analysis. In this sense, it brings together complementary strands of applied 
economic research. Finally, in discussing the results of the empirical analysis, the paper 
emphasizes a few channels and factors that may make policy modelling in Africa different 
from other developing countries. 
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  Some stylised facts and empirical strategy 
 
Table 2 summarises some stylised facts on the relationship between government size 
and output volatility. The table shows the estimated coefficient of government consumption 
(here used as a proxy of government size) in a regression of real GDP growth volatility 
(measured by the five-year standard deviation of the annual growth rate of GDP per-capita 
and aggregate GDP). The p-value associated with each estimated coefficient is reported in 
brackets. The regression makes use of annual data over the period 1990-2007 for two samples 
of countries: one includes 83 developing countries; the other is limited to 34 African countries. 
All data are taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2008 issue).  
The beginning of the sample period is set to 1990 because prior to that year, fiscal data on 
African countries are less widely available. Government consumption is expressed in percent 
of GDP. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Columns 1 and 4 report simple OLS estimates from regressing output volatility on a 
constant and government consumption. The coefficients on government consumption are 
positive and statistically highly significant, suggesting that in both samples of countries a 
bigger government increases output volatility. Of course, government consumption is likely to 
be endogenous to volatility. For instance, Rodrik (1998) argues that in more volatile countries, 
government consumption works as a risk-insurance mechanism. Therefore, higher volatility 
could cause a bigger government through a demand-side effect. Columns 2 and 5 therefore re-
estimate the simple regression of columns 1 and 4, but using lagged values of government 
consumption as instruments. The estimated coefficients increase in both samples, remaining   8
always highly significant in statistical terms. It is worth noting that the marginal effect of an 
increase in government size on volatility is slightly higher in Africa than in the full group of 
developing countries. 
 
There are clearly other factors that determine output volatility in addition to 
government consumption. Accordingly, columns 3 and 6 show the estimated coefficients of 
government consumption when controlling for the following other determinants of volatility: 
the exports plus imports ratio to GDP, the index of capital account liberalization of Chinn and 
Ito (2007), the log per-capita GDP, and the credit provided by the banking sector in percent of 
GDP. These controls are meant to account for the impact on volatility of international trade 
and financial integration, economic development, and the depth of financial intermediation
2. 
Government consumption and all of the other controls are instrumented by their own lagged 
values. It can be seen that in both samples the evidence of a positive effect of government size 
on volatility is confirmed. The marginal effect is now sharply higher in Africa than in the 
sample of all developing countries
3. 
 
There are therefore two main stylised facts that can be extracted from the evidence 
reported in table 2. First, in both groups of countries, the relationship between government 
size and output volatility is positive. This result is in sharp contrast with the findings of Gali 
                                                 
2 This list of controls is not meant to be exhaustive. Other possible explanatory variables include the type of 
exchange rate regime, the quality of institutions and the effectiveness of checks and balances in fiscal policy 
making, and the institutional arrangements concerning the independence of the central bank. Moreover, in order 
to provide a more comprehensive measure of external risk, the indicator of international trade integration might 
be interacted with a measure of volatility of terms of trade. Some of these additional regressors are in fact 
collinear with the set of four controls used in columns 3 and 6. Their inclusion in the regression then implies that 
coefficients are less precisely estimated. However, when the regression is re-estimated to include all of the 
additional regressors, the central message of the table does not change: the estimated coefficient of government 
consumption remains positive and statistically significant at usual confidence levels.  
 
3The table does not report the estimated coefficients on the other four control variables. These are available upon 
request from the author. 
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et al. (1994) and Fatas and Mihov (2001), which are however obtained for samples of OECD 
economies. In other words, the negative relationship between government size and output 
volatility observed in OECD economies cannot be generalized to developing countries
4. 
Second, the slope of the relationship is steeper in Africa than in other developing countries. 
That is, even if the sign of the relationship is the same in Africa and elsewhere, African 
countries are structurally different from other developing countries in the sense that they are 
characterized by a higher elasticity of output volatility with respect to government size.  
 
The positive relationship between government size and output volatility may indicate 
either that fiscal policy has Keynesian effects and is used pro-cyclically or that it has non-
Keynesian effects and is used counter-cyclically. For policy design, it is important to 
understand which of the two alternatives is true. This however cannot be done within the 
context of a reduced form, single equation model. A two-step empirical strategy is more 
appropriate. In the first step (Section 3), the nature (Keynesian vs. non-Keynesian) of fiscal 
policy is assessed by estimating a simple consumption function. The estimated equation will 
be specified so to allow for structural differences between Africa and other developing 
countries. In the second step (Section 4), the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy is evaluated 
by looking at the co-movements between fiscal policy instruments and business cycle 
indicators. This exercise will look at each African country individually and summary statistics 
will be presented for the African continent as a whole.  .  
 
3.  The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy 
 
3.1   Empirical model 
                                                 
4 This is in line with the findings of Koskela and Viren (2003).   10
 
As outlined in the previous section, models yielding non-Keynesian effects of fiscal 
policy share a common prediction: the response of private consumption to a fiscal expansion 
is negative. This prediction can be further qualified by stressing that the effects of fiscal 
expansions on private consumption might be non-linear: positive (and hence Keynesian) at 
normal fiscal times and negative (and hence non-Keynesian) at non-normal fiscal times; that 
is, at times when the fiscal stimulus is significantly above average.  
 
To test this empirical prediction, Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) propose the estimation 
of a consumption function of the following type: 
 
(1)    it it it it it it it D Z D Z X c c η γ δ β α α + − + + + + = Δ − ) 1 ( 1 1 0  
 
where c is the log of per-capita household consumption expenditure, X is a set of control 
variables, Z is a set of fiscal policy variables, D is a dummy variable taking value 1 if year t in 
country i is a year of non-normal fiscal times, η is an error term, Δ is the difference operator, 
and α0 , α1 , β,  δ, and γ are the parameters to be estimated.  
 
In equation (1), the interaction between the fiscal variables Z and the dummy variable 
D captures possible non-linear effects of fiscal policy by allowing the elasticity of 
consumption to differ between normal and non-normal fiscal times. For practical purposes, 
non-normal fiscal times are defined in terms of the size of the change in the overall budget 
balance. In the full sample of developing countries, the average change in the budget balance 
(after the exclusion of outliers) is around 0.15 percentage points of GDP, with a standard 
deviation of just below 2. Based on these summary statistics, a threshold of 2 percentage   11
points of GDP is used to separate normal from non-normal fiscal times. The dummy variable 
D therefore takes value 1 in country i at year t if in that year the overall budget balance 
changes by more than 2 percentage points
5. 
 
The vector of controls X includes the annual change in log per-capita income and the 
lagged value of log per-capita income. Two different specifications of the set of fiscal 
variables will be used. The baseline specification uses the overall budget balance in percent of 
GDP as aggregate indicator of the fiscal policy stance. The extended specification instead 
uses both government expenditure and tax revenues in percent of GDP to capture effects 
stemming from the two sides of the budget. To allow for richer dynamics the model 
specification includes both the annual change and the lagged value of each fiscal policy 
variable. Letting y be the log of real per-capita GDP, b the overall budget balance in percent 
of GDP, g government expenditure in percent of GDP, and r tax revenues in percent of GDP, 
the baseline and the extended specification can then be respectively written as: 
 
(2)    + + Δ + Δ + + + = Δ − − − − it it it t it it it D b b y y c c ) ( 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 δ δ β β α α  
           it it it it D b b η γ γ + − + Δ + − ) 1 )( ( 1 2 1  
 
(3)    + + Δ + + Δ + Δ + + + = Δ − − − − − it it it it it t it it it D r r g g y y c c ) ( 1 4 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 δ δ δ δ β β α α  
                   it it it it it it D r r g g η γ γ γ γ + − + Δ + + Δ + − − ) 1 )( ( 1 4 3 1 2 1  
 
As discussed in Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), the distributed lag specification of 
equations (2) and (3) nests many of the specifications that have been used in the literature, 
                                                 
5 Of course, one might wonder how sensitive results are to changes in this definition. This issue is discussed later 
on. However, it is worth anticipating that the qualitative flavour of the results is robust to different definitions. 
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including both Euler-type specifications and error-correction correction models (see also 
Blinder and Deaton, 1986). In the baseline specification, negative values of δs and/or γs are 
indicative of Keynesian effects of fiscal policy: an increase in the budget balance (that is, a 
fiscal contraction) decreases private consumption. In the extended specification, Keynesian 
effects are identified by positive coefficients on g and Δg and/or negative coefficients on r 
and Δr: higher expenditure and/or lower taxes (that is, a fiscal expansion) increase private 
consumption. 
 
3.2  Results 
 
The results from estimating the consumption functions (2) and (3) are reported in 
Table 3. For each set of estimates the table reports: (i) the estimated coefficients on the 
control variables yt-1, ct-1, and Δyt; (ii) the estimated coefficients on the fiscal variables at 
normal fiscal times (when the dummy variable D takes value zero, that is when Δbit is in 
absolute value smaller than 2); and (iii) the estimated coefficients on the fiscal variables at 
non normal fiscal times (when the dummy variable D takes value one, that is when Δbit-1 is in 
absolute value larger than 2). In addition, the table reports the number of observations in the 
unbalanced panel. Data are taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank 
(2008 issue) and from the Government Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund 
(2008 issue). A detailed definition of the variables can be found in the appendix, together with 
the list of countries in the sample. The sample period is 1990-2007. Estimation in columns 1, 
2, 3, and 4 is by feasible GLS to account for the presence of cross-section heteroskedasticity. 
In columns 5 and 6 estimation is instead by instrumental variables in order to control for 
possible endogeneity of some of the regressors (see below). Finally, White robust coefficient 
covariances and standard errors are always computed.   13
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Column 1 presents the baseline model (2) estimated on the full sample of all 
developing countries. Only the lagged value of the budget balance at non-normal fiscal times 
displays a statistically significant coefficient. Its sign is consistent with the idea that fiscal 
policy has Keynesian effects: a lower balance (i.e. a higher deficit) accelerates private 
consumption growth. In column 2, the baseline specification is re-estimated on the sample of 
only African countries. There is now evidence that fiscal policy has Keynesian effects at both 
normal and non-normal fiscal times: the negative coefficient on Δbt means that a fiscal 
expansion increases private consumption growth.  
 
Columns 3 and 4 present the extended specification estimated on all developing 
countries and on African countries respectively. In the case of all developing countries, it is 
confirmed that fiscal policy has significant effects on private consumption only at non-normal 
fiscal times. These effects are however of a Keynesian nature: higher expenditure and lower 
taxes increase private consumption growth. In the case of African countries, fiscal policy 
affects private consumption at both normal and non-normal fiscal times, mainly through the 
change in government expenditure. The positive coefficient on Δgt again indicates that these 
effects are of a Keynesian nature. 
 
In columns 5 and 6, the baseline model is re-estimated on the African sample using 
instrumental variables (results for the extended model are available from the author upon 
request). The variables that can be suspected of being endogenous are the growth rate of per-
capita GDP (Δyt) and the change in the budget balance (Δbt). In fact, the Hausman test   14
(Davidson and McKinnon, 1993) reveals that only Δyt is certainly endogenous, while for Δbt 
results are more ambiguous. Nevertheless, in column 5 both variables are treated as 
endogenous. In this case, the list of instruments includes: all of the exogenous variables, 
lagged values of the two endogenous variables, country fixed effects, and two indicators of 
institutional quality. The country fixed effects are country’s legal origin and country’s latitude. 
The institutional variables are the quality of the polity and an index of effectiveness of checks 
and balances in policymaking (see Appendix for detailed definition). The country fixed 
effects are likely to be good instruments for the growth of per-capita GDP, while the quality 
of the polity and the index of checks and balances are potentially good instruments for the 
change in fiscal policy variables (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003 and 2004). The logic for 
introducing these additional instruments is to increase the number of over-identifying 
restrictions. This in turn makes it possible to test the validity of the choice of instruments 
through a Sargan test (Newey and West, 1989). The J-statistic of the Sargan test is 4.39. The 
null hypothesis that over-identfying restrictions are valid cannot be rejected at usual 
confidence levels. The estimated coefficients on the fiscal variable again provide evidence of 
Keynesian effects at normal fiscal times. On the contrary, there is no significant evidence of 
non-Keynesian effects at non-normal fiscal times. 
 
In column 6, only the growth rate of per-capita GDP is treated as endogenous. The 
variable Δbt is therefore instrumented by itself. The J-statistic is 3.31
6 and again the null 
hypothesis of the test of overidentfying restrictions is not rejected at usual confidence levels. 
The results strongly support the view that fiscal policy in Africa has Keynesian effects: the 
coefficients on the fiscal variable are all negative and statistically significant in three cases out 
of four. 
                                                 
6 The fact that the J-statistic is lower when Δbt is treated as exogenous is coherent with the result of the Hausman 
test that Δbt might effectively be exogenous to Δct.   15
 
A final issue concerns the robustness of the above results. The following sensitivity 
checks have been run and the full set of results is available upon request. First, the threshold 
for the identification of non-normal times has been changed. Higher thresholds cause 
coefficients of fiscal variables at non-normal fiscal times to be less precisely estimated, 
probably because of the reduction in the number of observations that qualify as non-normal 
fiscal times. The sign of the coefficient is however the same as in Table 3. Lower thresholds 
instead strengthen the statistical significance of coefficients at non-normal fiscal times in both 
groups of countries. Overall, changing the definition of non-normal fiscal times does not seem 
to change the evidence on the nature of fiscal policy effects. Second, different categories of 
expenditure have been used in the extended specification. While the definition of expenditure 
used in Table 3 includes all type of government spending (hence current plus capital 
expenditure), using only expenses for operating activities and/or public consumption in a 
stricter sense does not alter the results. Finally, even though the Hausman test clearly rejects 
the hypothesis that lagged levels of fiscal policy variables are endogenous to current private 
consumption growth, the baseline model has been re-estimated treating bt-1 in addition to Δbt 
and Δyt as endogenous. Again, results are remarkably similar to those in columns 5. 
 
4.  The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy 
 
The evidence produced in Section 3 clearly rejects the idea that fiscal policy has non-
Keynesian effects in developing countries in general, and in Africa in particular. On the 
contrary, there is quite robust evidence that effects are of a Keynesian nature. This implies 
that to stabilize output volatility, fiscal policy ought to be run counter-cyclically. In order to   16
see whether or not this is the case in African countries, the present section looks at the co-
movements between indicators of business cycle and a fiscal policy instrument. 
 
4.1  Statistical methodology 
 
Let  yt be a business cycle indicator. Given that the analysis will be conducted at 
country-level, the subscript i can be omitted. Also, let zt be a fiscal policy instrument. Making 
use of time-series observations, the correlation coefficient between these two variables can be 
computed as a measure of the intensity of their co-movements. The cyclical characterisation 
of fiscal policy then depends on the sign and statistical significance of the correlation 
coefficient: if it is positive, then fiscal policy is pro-cyclical; if it is negative, then fiscal policy 
is counter-cyclical; and if the coefficient is insignificant, then fiscal policy can be classified as 
a-cyclical. 
 
The implementation of this simple methodology requires however to address three 
issues. First, correlations calculated on the levels of the two series would not be very 
informative. In fact, both series (and all macroeconomic time series in general) incorporate 
two types of dynamics: (i) a long-term trend dynamic and (ii) a short term cyclical dynamic 
around the trend. The assessment of the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy must focus on the 
second dynamic. To this purpose, one could compute the correlation between annual growth 
rates of the two variables. This would correspond to a classical notion of business cycles, 
whereby recessions are identified by periods of decrease in the level of real output and 
expansions by periods of increase in the level of real output. An alternative approach is to 
make use of a statistical procedure to decompose the original time series in trend and cycle 
and then study the correlation between the cycle components of the series. This approach   17
corresponds to a notion of cycles in deviation, where a recession is identified by a decrease in 
the value of the cyclical component of output and an expansion by an increase in the cyclical 
component of output. To be pragmatic, this section presents results from both approaches. For 
the second approach, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) is used to 
decompose the series in trend and cyclical component
7. 
 
The second issue concerns the possible existence of lags in the response of fiscal 
policy to business cycle fluctuations. Policymakers might not immediately perceive a change 
in the business cycle phase and/or it might take time to change the fiscal policy stance to 
adjust to the new phase (i.e. the fiscal policy formation process may have to go through 
lengthy parliamentary discussions). Contemporaneous correlations between the two variables 
therefore need to be complemented by lagged correlations. Therefore, in addition to the 
correlation between yt and zt, the one-year lagged correlation between yt and zt+1 is also 
computed.  
 
The final issue relates to the choice of the variables. For the business cycle indicator yt 
the obvious choice is the log of real GDP. Alternative indicators that have been used in the 
literature, such as industrial production, are not always available for African countries. 
Moreover, given the production structure of many African countries, looking only at 
industrial production to identify the business cycle might be too restrictive. For the fiscal 
policy indicator zt, Kamisky et al. (2004) suggest looking at instruments more than outcomes. 
In his analysis of African countries, Diallo (2008) uses total government expenditure and 
current government expenditure. In this paper, the choice is constrained by the need to 
                                                 
7 The algorithm of Ravn and Uhlig (2002) is applied to determine the smoothing parameter of the HP filter. 
Using an alternative popular filter such as the Baxter-King band-pass filter (Baxter and King, 1999) does not 
produce any significant change in the results. 
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maximise the number of observations available for each country, given that – as already 
stressed – correlation are computed for each individual African country. It turns out that the 
series of public consumption are the longest available on average. Therefore, public 
consumption is taken to represent the fiscal policy instrument zt 
 
To sum up, for each African country for which at least 20 annual observations on 
public consumption are available over the period 1960-2007, four correlation coefficients are 
computed: (i) 
) 1 (
,z y ρ  is the contemporaneous correlation between the growth rate of real GDP 
and the growth rate of public consumption, (ii) 
) 1 (
1 , + z y ρ   is the one-year lagged correlation 
between the growth rate of real GDP in year t and the growth rate of public consumption in 
year t + 1, (iii) 
) 2 (
,z y ρ  is the contemporaneous correlation between the HP de-trended series of 
the real GDP and the HP de-trended series of public consumption, and (iv) 
) 2 (
1 , + z y ρ  is the one-
year lagged correlation between the HP de-trended series of real GDP at time t and the HP de-
trended series of real GDP at time t + 1.  
 
4.2  Results 
 
There are 37 African countries for which 20 or more annual observations on public 
consumption are available. The four correlation coefficients and their degree of statistical 
significant computed on the basis of a two-tailed t-test are reported in Appendix table A1 for 
each of these 37 countries. The distribution of each of correlation coefficient over the full 
sample of 37 African countries is plotted in Figure 1
8. The summary statistics of these four 
distributions are instead reported in Table 4 below. Table 4 also reports, for each group of 
                                                 
8 In each panel of the figure, the base of a column identifies a range of values for the correlation coefficient and 
the height of the column gives the number of countries with correlation coefficient falling within that range. 
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correlation coefficients, the number of countries with a positive and significant statistical 
correlation and of those with a negative and significant statistical correlation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The following interesting patterns emerge from the analysis Table 4 and the Figure 1. 
First, average correlation coefficients are always positive, suggesting that fiscal policy is not, 
on average, counter-cyclical in Africa. On the contrary it tends to be pro-cyclical. Second, 
contemporaneous correlations are on average higher than lagged correlations. This is 
important since it may indicate that countries tend to correct the fiscal policy stance over time. 
As discussed in the next section, a possible interpretation of this finding is that countries do 
not have enough statistical information to know in which cyclical phase they are at time t. 
However, in year t + 1, when more statistical information becomes available, they are better 
able to observe the cyclical phase. Hence, they can adjust the fiscal policy instrument 
accordingly. Third, the distributions of contemporaneous correlations have long right tails, 
while the distributions of lagged correlations have long left tails. This statistical difference is 
coherent with the observation that lagged correlations are a bit less pro-cyclical than 
contemporaneous correlations. Fourth, the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy does differ 
across countries to some considerable extent. This is evident from the fact that the peaks of 
the distributions are rather flat (relative to the normal distribution) while standard deviations 
are quite large. Fifth, out of a total of 148 correlation coefficients (four coefficients for each 
of the 37 countries), only two are significantly negative. These are the lagged correlations of 
Guinea-Bissau. In other words, evidence of a counter-cyclical response of fiscal policy to 
output fluctuations is limited to one country (Guinea-Bissau) and even in that country only to 
lagged correlations. Moreover, in that country, contemporaneous correlations are strongly   20
positive, so that overall one cannot unambiguously conclude that Guinea-Bissau runs a 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. All of the other African countries examined here certainly do 
not run fiscal policy counter-cyclically. 
 
Based on the quantitative evidence reported in table A1 in the appendix, Table 5 
classifies the 37 African countries according to the cyclical behaviour of their fiscal policy. 
Countries with three or four positive and significant correlation coefficients are classified as 
‘pro-cyclical’. Countries with only two positive and significant correlation coefficients (the 
other two being insignificant) are classified as ‘weakly pro-cyclical’. Countries with only one 
or none significant correlation coefficient are classified as ‘a-cyclical’. Using these definitions 
and criteria, six countries can be identified as running a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Eleven 
countries are instead in the category of weakly pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Out of these eleven, 
six (Algeria, Botswana, Madagascar, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal) appear to correct the fiscal 
policy stance after one year. Finally, fiscal policy seems to be substantially a-cyclical in 
nineteen countries. In a large subgroup of fourteen countries, none of the four correlation 
coefficients passes the statistical significance test. In theory, countries with two or more 
negative and significant correlation coefficients should be classified as ‘(weakly) counter-
cyclical’. However, with the possible exception of Guinea-Bissau, none of the other 36 
countries has negative and significant correlation coefficients. As already mentioned, Guinea-
Bissau is an ambiguous case. Its two positive contemporaneous correlations would put it in 
the group of weakly pro-cyclical. But its two negative lagged correlations would identify it as 
a weakly counter-cyclical country. Therefore, in the table, Guinea-Bissau is left out of any 
other category. 
  
5.  Policy discussion   21
 
The empirical evidence of this paper provides the following picture. In spite of the fact 
that it has Keynesian effects, fiscal policy in Africa is not run counter-cyclically, but it is 
often pro-cyclical. This cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy instruments translates into a 
positive correlation between government size (as for instance measured by the GDP share of 
government consumption) and output growth volatility. In other words, fiscal policy seems to 
add to other structural factors – such as the heavy exposure to international commodity prices 
volatility and the unstable socio-political conditions – to increase volatility in African 
economies. Given the damaging impact of volatility in a developmental perspective, the lack 
of a systematic counter-cyclical fiscal policy in African countries configures as a major policy 
failure. The purpose of this section is to review some of the reasons that, within the specific 
context of Africa, might contribute to explaining why countries do not adopt such a counter-
cyclical stance. 
 
As discussed already in Section 2, two factors that are often mentioned to explain the 
pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy in developing countries are: (i) the pro-cyclical pattern 
of international capital flows and credit and (ii) political-economic interactions between 
citizens and the fiscal authorities. Both seem to be relevant in Africa, but some qualifications 
and extensions might be in order. With respect to the first factor (the pro-cyclicality of 
capitals and credit), the issue in Africa is essentially one of limited policy space for fiscal 
authorities. Low incomes (and hence a small tax base) coupled with a large informal sector 
and inefficient tax administrations imply a high dependence of African countries on external 
resources to finance expenditure. The pro-cyclical pattern of external resources then makes it 
very difficult for the average African country to run fiscal policy counter-cyclically. 
Furthermore, in several countries, the fiscal policy space is further constrained by the   22
adoption of fiscal rules that set target levels for the overall deficit and/or specific budget 
components. Many of the regional economic communities existing in Africa make use of 
these rules to drive the process of economic integration. In the case of the two CFA monetary 
unions, convergence criteria on fiscal policy variables are part of a formal multilateral 
surveillance framework, similar in spirit to the agreements disciplining convergence in the 
European Monetary Union. The problem with these rules, as for instance discussed in 
Manasse (2007), is that they often prevent policymakers from adopting a counter-cyclical 
stance and actually encourage a pro-cyclical stance. Therefore, while some restrictions to 
discretionarity might help African countries to consolidate their public finances, specific 
attention must be given to how these rules are designed. One possibility is to make use of 
cyclically adjusted variables in writing the rules. Alternatively, threshold values for fiscal 
variables could be defined as moving averages over periods of (say) three years rather than as 
targets to be met annually. In practical terms, the experience of Chile (as for instance 
documented in Garcia et al. 2005) might provide some useful insights on the efficient design 
of fiscal rules. 
 
The second factor, namely political-economic interactions, is also likely to be relevant 
in Africa. However, the formalization proposed by Alesina et al. (2008) of political-economic 
equilibrium with a Leviathan government implies a type of strategic interaction between 
politicians and voters that may not be fully representative of the African political context. 
Woo (2008) proposes a political mechanism where social polarization determines 
coordination failures in fiscal-policy making, thus leading to a pro-cyclical (inefficient) fiscal 
policy stance. This mechanism is probably better suited to represent the reality of a larger 
number of African countries. An implication of Woo’s argument is that stronger democratic   23
processes would be conducive to a more counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance. This conclusion 
is clearly supported by the recent empirical findings reported by Diallo (2008). 
 
There are two additional recommendations on how fiscal policy could be made more 
counter-cyclical in Africa. One concerns the use of automatic stabilizers. In most African 
countries, the substantial ineffectiveness of formal social safety networks implies that 
automatic stabilizers are weak. However, automatic stabilizers are an important component of 
a counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance as they increase expenditure at times of recession. 
Strengthening automatic stabilizers would therefore contribute to reducing the degree of pro-
cyclicality or a-cyclicality of fiscal policy. The other recommendation stems from the 
observation that at least some of the countries in the sample tend to correct their fiscal policy 
stance after one year. As already noted, this lagged adjustment could be the consequence of 
the policymakers’ uncertainty about the cyclical phase the country is going through. In order 
to reduce this uncertainty, countries should invest more in the production and monitoring of 
statistical data for business cycle analysis. In this way, with the technical assistance of 
international partners to set-up appropriate statistical methodologies, African countries will be 
able to improve their understanding of cyclical fluctuations.    
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper presented three pieces of empirical evidence on fiscal policy in African 
countries. First, there is a positive relationship between government size and output volatility. 
This positive relationship exists in the sample of all developing countries, but it seems to be 
quantitatively stronger in Africa than elsewhere. Second, there is no evidence of non-
Keynesian effects in Africa and in the whole of developing countries. In fact, the estimates   24
point to Keynesian effects in Africa, especially at normal fiscal times. Third, fiscal policy 
instruments in Africa do not have a counter-cyclical behaviour. The sample of African 
countries examined is in fact split in almost two equally large subgroups: one where fiscal 
policy is pro-cyclical or weakly pro-cyclical and one where fiscal policy is substantially a-
cyclical. Taken together, these three pieces of evidence convey the following message: in 
spite of the Keynesian nature of its effects, fiscal policy is not run counter-cyclically, which 
means that it does not contribute to the stabilization of output volatility. On the contrary, to 
the extent that it is run pro-cyclically, fiscal policy causes greater output growth volatility. 
Given the development costs of volatility, the lack of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance 
configures as a major policy failure. The paper then identifies some factors that could explain 
why fiscal policy is not counter-cyclical in Africa and how to address them. The design of 
new fiscal rules, the strengthening of democratic institutions, and the improvement of the 
empirical and statistical knowledge needed to understand business cycles are examples of 
interventions that will encourage the adoption of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance. 
 
Two main directions of future research on this topic can be identified at this stage. 
First, one might want to explore in a more systematic fashion what determines the probability 
of a country running a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Using for instance the taxonomy of table 5, 
one can construct a limited dependent variable that takes value 1 for pro-cyclical and weakly 
pro-cyclical countries and zero otherwise. Then probit and logit analysis can be used to 
regress this binary dependent variable on the characteristics of the various African countries. 
The exercise could be extended to non-African countries, so that the sample would also 
include countries that effectively run fiscal policy counter-cyclically. In this case, the 
dependent variable could be coded as a trichotomous variable and multinomial logit could be 
applied.    25
 
Second, different methodologies to characterise the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy 
instruments could be explored. For instance, one could construct a chronology of turning 
points of the relevant business cycle and fiscal policy indicators and then calculate how many 
times the two series are in the same phase. While the basic result that fiscal policy is not 
conducted counter-cyclically would most likely be confirmed, the chronologies would offer 
additional insights on the factors and events that make fiscal policy pro-cyclical.  
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Table 1: Volatility of output and consumption growth in selected country groups 
 
  Per-capita output 
growth volatility 
Per-capita private 
consumption growth volatility 
 

















































































Notes: For each country groups and each sub-period, volatility is computed as the average of the standard 
deviation of per-capita income growth and per-capita private consumption growth in each country of the group 
over each sub-period. 
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Table 2.Estimated coefficient of government size in output volatility regressions 
 
  Dependent variable is:  
volatility of per-capita output growth 
 
Dependent variable is: 
volatility of aggregate output growth 
























































































Notes: The set of controls includes: exports and imports in percentage of GDP, an index of capital account liberalization 
borrowed from Chinn and Ito (2007), credit supplied by the banking sector in percent of GDP, and per-capita income. All 
regressions also include a constant term. In IVestimation, regressors are instrumented by their own lagged values. For each 
estimated coefficient, the table also shows the associated p-value (in brackets) and the number of observations available for 
estimation. Standard errors and covariances are corrected for White cross-section heteroscedasticity.   28
Table 3. Regression results 
 













Constant -0.503  -3.554  0.821  -3.028  -2.801  -2.696 
ct-1  -2.586*** -1.659 -2.110***  -1.347  -1.051  -4.154 
yt-1  2.556*** 2.050 1.865***  1.761  1.355  4.179 
Δyt  0.808*** 0.789*** 0.846***  0.809***  0.819***  0.851*** 
            
 
Fiscal variables in normal fiscal times: D = 0 (|Δbt| < 2) 
 
Δbt  -0.064 -0.804***      -1.036***  -3.337*** 
bt-1  -0.030 -0.165      -0.197*  -0.426** 
Δgt     -0.014  0.074*     
gt-1     -0.004  0.026     
Δrt     0.014 -0.017     
rt-1     0.039  -0.041     
            
 
Fiscal variables in non-normal fiscal times: 1- D = 0 (|Δbt| > 2) 
 
Δbt  0.001 -0.085***      -0.504 -0.850 
bt-1  -0.141*** -0.062      -0.214  -0.648** 
Δgt     -0.016  0.0158**     
gt-1     0.072**  -0.039     
Δrt     -0.107***  -0.011    
rt-1     -0.105**  0.015     
            
N.Obs 701  194  699  194  181  146 
Note: The dependent variable is always the growth rate of private per capita consumption. Estimation methodologies are 
described in the text. For variables description and sources see Appendix 2. Full sample estimates in columns 1 and 3; African 
sample estimates in columns 2, 4, 5, and 6  *, **, *** denote statistical significance of estimated coefficients at 10%, 5%, and 
1% confidence level respectively.    29
Table 4. Summary statistics of distributions of correlation coefficients in the African 
sample 
 
  ) 1 (
,z y ρ  
) 1 (
1 , + z y ρ  
) 2 (
,z y ρ  
) 2 (
1 , + z y ρ  
Mean  0.212 0.128 0.222 0.178 
Median  0.147 0.109 0.203 0.201 
Maximum  0.807 0.437 0.734 0.647 
Minimum  -0.139 -0.281 -0.129 -0.335 
Std.  Deviation  0.235 0.196 0.224 0.236 
Skewness  0.745 -0.220 0.328 -0.110 
Kurtosis  2.681 2.13 2.205  2.500 
Pro-cyclical  13 8 16  13 
Counter-cyclical  0 1 0 1 
      
Note: Pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) is the number of correlation coefficients in each distribution that are 
positive (negative) and statistically significant at usual confidence levels.    30
Table 5. Classification of African countries according to the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy 
 
Behavior Countries  Total
Pro-cyclical behavior    6 
   - 4 positive correlation coefficients  Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon  3 
   - 3 positive correlation coefficients  Chad, DRC, Ethiopia  3 
    
Weakly pro-cyclical behavior    11 
   - 2 positive correlation coefficients    
      i. both contemporaneous  Algeria, Botswana, Madagascar, Morocco, Rwanda, 
Senegal 
6 
      ii. both lagged  Guinea, Malawi  2 
      iii. one contemporaneous and one lagged  Benin, South Africa, Uganda  3 
    
A-cyclical behavior    19 
   - 1 positive correlation coefficient    
      i. contemporaneous  Zambia  1 
      ii. lagged  Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia  4 
   - No significant correlation coefficient  Kenya, Burkina F., Cape Verte, Comoros, Egypt, Gambia, 
Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Togo, Tunisia, Zimbabwe 
14 
    
Others (ambiguous)  Guinea-Bissau  1 
Notes: the classification is based on the correlation coefficients reported in Table A1.   31
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of correlation coefficients in the African sample 
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Notes : The base of each column identifies a range for the correlation coefficients. The height of each column gives the number 
of countries with correlation coefficients within the identified range. Thus, for instance, in panel A, the second column from the 
left means that there are six countries with contemporaneous correlation between the growth rates of the two series falling 
within the range -0.1 and 0.0.    32
Appendix 
 
Table A1. : Cyclicality of fiscal policy in African countries 
 Growth  rates  Cyclical  components 
 
        
) 1 (
,z y ρ      
) 1 (
1 , + z y ρ          
) 2 (
,z y ρ        
) 2 (
1 , + z y ρ  
 (column  I) 
 
(column II)  (column III)  (column IV) 
Algeria 0.674***  -0.006  0.659***  0.060 
Benin 0.070  0.096  0.391***  0.369** 
Botswana 0.330*  0.249 0.374**  0.156 
Burkina Fasu  0.104  0.092  0.080  -0.031 
Cameroon  0.249* 0.352** 0.439*** 0.537*** 
Cape Verte  0.185  0.027  0.292  0.029 
Chad  -0.139 0.343** 0.485*** 0.647*** 
Comoros Is.  0.088  0.026  0.186  0.180 
Cote  d'Ivoire  0.807***  0.330** 0.734*** 0.381*** 
DRC 0.494***  0.306**  0.282*  0.230 
Egypt -0.062  -0.090  0.055  -0.096 
Ethiopia 0.409**  0.257  0.466**  0.469** 
Gabon 0.554***  0.430***  0.539***  0.408*** 
Gambia -0.020  -0.001  -0.129  -0.202 
Ghana 0.154  0.052  0.017  0.048 
Guinea 0.052  0.389*  0.220  0.423* 
Guinea-Bissau 0.572***  -0.281*  0.391**  -0.335** 
Kenya 0.217  -0.011  0.028  -0.137 
Leshoto  -0.029  0.218 0.166 0.273* 
Madagascar 0.533***  -0.154  0.473***  0.206 
Malawi -0.063  0.362**  0.000  0.279* 
Mali 0.148  -0.220  -0.037  -0.030 
Mauritania 0.125 -0.033  -0.092  -0.152 
Mauritius -0.033  0.298  0.168 0.619*** 
Morocco 0.356**  0.063  0.443*** 0.218 
Mozambique 0.269  0.276  0.241  0.442** 
Namibia 0.008  -0.012  0.113  0.323* 
Rwanda 0.607***  -0.014  0.493*** 0.197 
Senegal 0.277*  -0.087  0.288**  0.188 
Seychelles 0.099 0.437  -0.040  0.226 
South Africa  0.450***  0.402***  0.134  0.115 
Sudan 0.101  -0.232  -0.011  -0.088 
        
Table continued next page  33
Table A1 : cont. 
 Growth  rates  Cyclical  components 
 
       
) 1 (
,z y ρ     
) 1 (
, 1 z y+ ρ       
) 2 (
,z y ρ       
) 1 (
, 1 z y+ ρ  
 (column  I) 
 
(column II)  (column III)  (column IV) 
Swaziland 0.012  0.184  0.051 0.149 
Togo -0.065  0.205  0.096  0.212 
Tunisia 0.076  0.122  -0.036  0.076 
Uganda 0.226  0.240  0.351*  0.396** 











Notes: The table reports bilateral correlation coefficients between output GDP and government consumption. Columns I and 
II report correlations of growth rates of the two variables; Column I is the contemporaneous correlation and Column II is the 
correlation with fiscal policy lagged by one year. Columns III and IV report correlations of the HP-filtered cyclical 
components of the two variables; Column III is the contemporaneous correlation and Column IV is the correlation with fiscal 
policy lagged by one year. The overall assessment is based on the joint consideration of the four coefficients (see also text for 
details). Only countries for which more than 20 annual observations on both variables are available are included in the table. 
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Variables description and data sources 
 




Per-capita output growth volatility 
 
Five year standard deviation of the annual 







Per-capita private consumption 
growth volatility 
 
Five year standard deviation of the annual 
growth rate of per-capita private consumption. 
Per-capita private consumption is defined as 
household final consumption expenditure and 
includes the market value of all goods and 
services, including durable products (such as 
cars, washing machines, and home computers), 
purchased by households. It excludes purchases 
of dwellings but includes imputed rent for 
owner-occupied dwellings. It also includes 
payments and fees to governments to obtain 





Aggregate output growth 
volatility 
 
Five year standard deviation of the annual 










One year lagged value of per-capita private 
consumption.  
WDI 
Lagged per-capita output  
(yt-1) 
 
One year lagged value of per-capita GDP at 
constant market prices. 
WDI 
Per-capita output growth (Δyt) 
 
Annual growth rate of per-capita GDP at 
constant market prices. 
 
WDI 
Change in overall budget balance  
(Δbt) 
 
Annual change in overall budget balance in 
percent of GDP. Overall budget balance is 
revenues (including grants) minus expense, 
minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. 
Positive values indicate fiscal contractions (i.e. a 
tighter fiscal policy stance). Negative values 
indicate fiscal expansions (i.e. a more 
expansionary fiscal policy stance). 
 
Computed 
from data in 
WDI and 
GFS 
Lagged overall budget balance  
(bt-1) 
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Annual change in government expenditure in 
percent of GDP. Government expenditure is cash 
payments for operating activities of the 





Lagged government expenditure  
(gt-1) 
 
One year lagged value of government 
expenditure in percent of GDP 
WDI and 
GFS 
Change in tax revenues  
(Δrt) 
 
Annual change in total tax revenues in percent of 
GDP. Tax revenues include taxes on income, 
profits, and capital gains, taxes on payroll and 
workforce, taxes on property, taxes on goods and 




Lagged tax revenues  (rt-1) 
 





Contemporaneous correlation of 
growth rates of aggregate output 
and government consumption 
(
) 1 (
,z y ρ ) 
 
Correlation coefficient between the growth rate 
of aggregate GDP in year t and the growth rate 
of government consumption in year t 
Computed 
from data in 
WDI and 
GFS 
Lagged correlation of growth 
rates of aggregate output and 
government consumption (
) 1 (
1 , + z y ρ ) 
 
Correlation coefficient between growth rate of 
aggregate GDP in year t and growth rate of 
government consumption in year t+1 
Computed 
from data in 
WDI and 
GFS 
Contemporaneous correlation of 
cyclical components of aggregate 
output and government 
consumption (
) 2 (
,z y ρ ) 
 
Correlation coefficient between the cyclical 
component of aggregate GDP in year t and the 
cyclical component of government consumption 
in year t. Cyclical components are obtained from 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
Computed 
from data in 
WDI and 
GFS 
Lagged correlation of cyclical 
components of aggregate output 
and government consumption 
(
) 2 (
1 , + z y ρ ) 
 
Correlation coefficient between the cyclical 
component of aggregate GDP in year t and the 
cyclical component of government consumption 
in year t+ 1. Cyclical components are obtained 
from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
Computed 





General government final consumption 
expenditure. It includes all government current 
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Exports plus imports in percent of GDP  WDI 
Capital account liberalization 
 
Index of capital account liberalization.  Chinn and Ito 
(2007) 
 
Credit by banking sector 
 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector 
in percent of GDP. It includes all credit to 
various sectors on a gross basis, with the 
exception of credit to the central government, 
which is net.  
 
WDI 
Non-normal fiscal times 
 
Dummy variable taking value 1 in year t if the 
annual change in the overall budget balance in 
that year is greater than 2 percentage points of 
GDP in absolute value.  
 
Computed 





Aggregate index of quality of the polity. It 
therefore ranges from +10 (corresponding to 
strongly democratic countries) to -10 




Checks and balances 
 
Institutionalized constraints on the decision-






Dummy variable taking value if the commercial 
code or the company law of the country has its 
origin in the English Common Law 
 




Absolute value of the latitude of the country, 
scaled to take value between 0 and 1. 
La Porta et 
al. (1999) 
 
Notes:  Sources are as follows: 
  1. WDI is the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, 2008 issue 
  2. GFS is the Government Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Funds, 2008 issue 
3. Chinn and Ito (2007) is Chinn, M. and Ito, H. 2007. A New Measure of Financial Openness.    
Forthcoming Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. The database is available on line at: 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html 
4. Polity IV database is Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007 
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Principal Investigators,George Mason University and Colorado 
State University; Ted Robert Gurr, Founder University of Maryland. The database is available on line at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
5. La Porta et al. (1999) is La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R., 1999. The Quality 
of Government. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 15, 222-279.   37
 
List of countries included in the regressions of tables 2 and 3 
 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahanas, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belarus, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Congo Dem. 
Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hong-Kong, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, South Korea, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome et Principe, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor l’Este, 
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab 
Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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